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Situs of Vendor's Interest in

Contract of Sale of Real
Estate Under Colorado
Inheritance Tax Law
By W. CLAYTON CARPENTER*
In a recent decision the Attorney General of Colorado has ruled that
the interest of a deceased vendor in a contract for the sale of real estate is
subject to Colorado inheritance tax, provided the vendor was a resident
of Colorado, even though the real estate is located outside of Colorado,
and, conversely, that where the deceased vendor was a non-resident and
the real estate located in Colorado, the interest of the deceased vendor in
such contract is not taxable under Colorado law.
The opinion of the Attorney General states in part:
"In view of the position that the Colorado courts have taken
with reference to such contracts, I am of the opinion that, as regards
the doctrine of equitable conversion, our courts would follow the
majority rule rather than the minority rule and would hold that
there is an equitable conversion of real estate into personalty at the
date of the execution of the contract.
"I am of the opinion that in the case of a non-resident decedent who, during his lifetime, enters into an executory contract for
the sale of his real estate situate in Colorado, an equitable conversion
occurs at the date of execution of the contract and that for inheritance taxation purposes the interest of such vendor should be considered intangible personal property and not real estate; and that
the interest of the vendee in such a contract should be considered
real estate. In the case of a resident decedent who, during his lifetime, enters into an executory contract for the sale of his land situate outside the State of Colorado, I am of the opinion that the interest of the vendor should be considered intangible personal property
and taxed as such."'
Irrespective of inheritance tax laws, it is well established as a fundamental principle of the laws of descent and distribution that the interest
of a deceased vendor under a contract of sale of real estate constitutes personal property and passes to his executor or administrator, and that the
*Of the Denver bar.
'Letter dated July 26, 1941, from Attorney General Gail L. Ireland to Inheritance
Tax Commissioner Berton T. Gobble.
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interest of a deceased vendee under such a contract is real estate and descends to his heirs at law.
Storey states the rule as follows:
"Thus if a man has entered into a valid contract for the purchase of land, he is treated in equity as the equitable owner of the
land, and the vendor is treated as the owner of the money. The
purchaser may devise it as land, even before the conveyance is made,
and it passes by descent to his heir as land. * * *
"Under such circumstances the vendee is treated as the owner
of the land, and it is devisable and descendible as his real estate.
On the other hand the money is treated as the personal estate of the
vendor, and is subject to the like modes of disposition by him as
other personalty,
and is distributable in the same manner on his
2
death."
This rule is based upon the theory of equitable conversion.
In determining the taxability of a decedent vendor's interest under
the inheritance tax laws, it would seem that the same rule should apply,
and most of the courts have so held. Their decisions are based upon
three legal theories.
The state of Washington follows the theory of equitable conversion:
"We have consistently held that the situs of intangible property is at all times at the domicile of the owner. We have also
repeatedly held that a vendor's interest under an executory contract
for the sale of land should be treated as personalty for the purpose
of administration. We cannot see any good reason for holding
that, for the purpose of administration of an estate, a vendor's interest in such a contract should be treated as personalty but not so
treated when the question of inheritance taxation is involved. The
two situations are not distinguishable on principle." '
Some courts have takeii the position that the effect of a contract of
sale is practitally the same as a mortgage. The vendor is said to hold the
bare legal title to the land in trust for the vendee and as security for the
payment of the debt. This view is touched upon by the Colorado Supreme Court, in Marvin v. Stimpson.4 In that case the court quoted with
approval the following statement from Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence:
" 'By the terms of the contract the land ought to be conveyed
2

STOREY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) 486, §1092.
'Inre Eilermann's Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P. (2d) 763 (1934).
KIDDER, STATE INHERITANCE TAX AND TAXABILITY OF TRUSTS (1934)

'23 Colo. 174, 46 Pac. 673 (1996).

See also
250.
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to the vendee, and the purchase price ought to be transferred to the
vendor; equity, therefore, regards these as done: the vendee as having acquired the property in the land, and the vendor as having
acquired the property in the price. The vendee is looked upon and
treated as the owner of the land; an equitable estate has vested in
him commensurate with that provided for by the contract, whether
in fee, for life, or for years; although the vendor remains owner
of the legal estate, he holds it as a trustee for the vendee to whom all
the beneficial interests has passed, having a lien on the land, even
if in possession of the vendee, as security for any unpaid portion of
the purchase money.' "
Under inheritance tax laws, the general rule has been that mortgage
notes, like stocks and bonds, are considered intangible personal property
subject to tax by the state of decedent's domicile.
Other courts have not attempted to apply any particular theory to
support the taxability, but have taken the broader ground that intangible
personal property is taxable at the domicile of the decedent, that any
contract right, whether with relation to property or not, is an intangible
property right which can be appraised and taxed by the state'of the
domicile of the decedent.
This holding is adhered to in In Re Russell's Estate, the court
saying:
"*
*
*
the amount due upon the contract of sale must
be regarded as intangible, and not tangible, property, and, as the
decedent was a nonresident, the transfer thereof is not subject to
a tax. '""

In State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, the Minnesota Supreme
Court said:
"The decedent sold his Montana land under an executory contract which obligated the vendee to pay the purchase price and gave
him the right to the possession of the land. If the decedent's interest under this contract is to be deemed personal property, it is
subject to a succession tax in Minnesota, the state of his domicile;
if it is to be deemed real estate, it is not subject to such tax in
Minnesota, but only in Montana, where the land is located. We
are of opinion that State t. Rand, 39 Minn. 502, 40 N. W. 835,
is decisive of the question under consideration. In that case the
defendants, residents of the city of Minneapolis, sold a tract of
land in that city under an executory contract which obligated the
'Supra, note 4, at 182-183. 46 Pac. at 676.
"ll9Misc. 12, 194N. Y. Supp. 837 (1922),
'145 Minn. 155, 176 N. W. 493 (1920).
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vendee, a corporation, to pay the purchase price and entitled it to
the possession of the land. It was held in an exhaustive opinion
that the interest of the vendors under this executory contract was
taxable as a credit under the general tax laws."

In Dodge County v.Burns,8 the Nebraska court held that the interest of a deceased New York vendor could not be reached for inheritance
tax purposes in Nebraska.
While the Attorney General seems to have based his opinion upon
the theory of equitable conversion, which is of course sufficient to sustain it where that theory is accepted in applying both the laws of descent
and distribution and inheritance tax laws, the third or broader ground
just referred to may ultimately prove to be the soundest basis in view
of the recent trend of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States.'
The mortgage theory, if solely relied upon in Colorado, might lead
to distinctions based upon the different forms of contracts, because of the
decisions of our Supreme Court holding some forms of contracts of sale
to be like mortgages and others not to be. 10 It is doubtful whether any
distinction on such a basis for tax purposes would b'e sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States, which has recently declined to base
taxable status upon "niceties of the art of conveyancing."'"
Too close an adherence to the doctrine of equitable conversion may
also lead the courts into difficulties. This seems to have been the case
in a recent Pennsylvania decision, In re Estate of Henry S. Paul,'2 which
holds that the decedent vendor's interest cannot be taxed by the state of
his domicile. That case involved a resident of Pennsylvania, who died
seized of real estate in New Jersey and Massachusetts concerning which he
had entered into contracts of sale prior to his death. The Pennsylvania
taxing officers appraised the contracts at less than their unpaid balances,
and assessed an inheritance tax thereon. During the administration of
the estate, these balances were paid and deeds issued to the purchasers
by the executor of the estate. In reversing the action of the taxing
officers and holding the decedent's interests in the contracts nontaxable
inPennsylvania, the court seemed to be influenced by six cases: Frick u.
'89 Neb. 534, 131 N. W. 922 (1911).
'See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. ed. 1339 (1939).
and Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913, 83 L. ed. 1356 (1939), although our subject does not include any consideration of the power of two states to
tax the vendor's interest.
"°See Morris, Must Colorado Real Property Installment Sales Be Foreclosed as
Mortgages? (1932) 9 DiCTA 320.
1
"Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60S. Ct. 444, 84 L. ed. 604 (1940).
1303 Pa. 330, 154 Ard. 503, 78 A. L. R. 779 (1931).
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Pennsylvania,1 3 In re Robinson's Estate,i4 In re Croxton's Estate,1 5 Mc-

Curdy u. McCurdy,' Heymann v. Viane,1 7 and Safe Deposit & Trust
Company v. Virginia.'s
The Frick case is well known. It holds that the situs of tangible
personal property for inheritance tax purposes is the state in which the
property is located, not the state of domicile of the owner.
The facts in the Robinson and Croxton cases are very meagerly
stated in the reports, but they both apparently involve.the question as to
whether the provisions of the wills under consideration in those cases
worked an equitable ccnversion of the real estate for inheritance tax purposes, and it was held that they did not.
In the McCurdy case, an ancillary administrator tried to compel
the domiciliary administrator to pay a mortgage owed by the decedent
on land in the state of the ancillary administration so as to leave the full
value of the real estate in the latter state for taxation. The contention
was made that the doctrine of equitable conversion required the court
to consider that the debt would be paid by the state of domiciliary administration. The court refused to so hold, saying that the ancillary
administration had to be carried on independently of the domiciliary
administration, and consequently the only taxable value of the real
estate would be the equity of redemption. The court did remark in
the course of its opinion:
"The law of equitable conversion ought not to be invoked
merely to subject property to taxation, especially when the question
is one of jurisdiction between different states.""'
In the Heymann case the will provided that the executor should
sell the real estate, and this was done. Thereupon, the executor contended that the inheritance tax lien had shifted from the real estate to the
proceeds, but the court held to the contrary, saying:
"The doctrine of equitable conversion may not be relied on to
subject property to taxation or to shift the lien of the tax from the
2
real property to the fund."- 0

With these cases in mind, the Pennsylvania court argued that the
vendor's interest in contracts of sales could not be considered intangible
1268 U.S. 473, 45 S.Ct. 603, 69 L. ed. 1058 (1925).
"285 Pa. 308, 132 Atd. 127 (1926).

"288 Pa. 184, 135 At. 626 (1927).
"197 Mass. 248, 83 N. E. 881, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 329, 14 Ann. Cas. 859
(1908).
11252 N. Y. 159, 169 N. E. 124 (1929).
s280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59, 74 L. ed. 180 (1929).
"Supra note 16, at 250, 83 N. E. at 882.
"Supra note 17, at 166, 169 N. E. at 126.
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personal property, subject to the Pennsylvania inheritance tax, because
(1) the doctrine of equitable conversion could not be availed of to subject the property to taxation; (2) the existence of the contract of sale
was therefore of no effect; (3) the "reality" was the real estate in the
contract; (4) under the Frick case the "reality" was physically present
in the foreign state and therefore outside the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania;
and (5) the trend of current decisions was in favor of limiting the power
of taxation to the state in which the property was actually located.
The court said, in part:
"There can be no question but that no tax could be collected
on the lands as lands. * * * Is this situation altered because
of the existence of the writings under which the decedent had
agreed to convey the lands when the consideration therefor was
paid? Is the thing sought to be taxed any the less the land because of the writing, the vendor being still possessed of the real
estate when he died?
"We are asked to disregard the fact of the testator still holding
title to and possession of the lands, and to indulge in the makebelieve that the land had been transmuted into something else.
We are not prepared to do so. The agreements of sale are not the
vital factor. * * *
"While an agreement for sale of land, which contains a promise to pay the purchase price agreed upon, is in one sense a chose
in action, it differs in essential respects from the ordinary chose.
Aside from the agreement to sell, no such liability ever did exist.
Its basic purpose, as a writing, is to fix the rights of the vendor and
the vendee in the land; liability for the purchase price is but secondary and contingent. The fee in the land is still in the vendor, and
it is the fee which is to be transferred upon payment of the balance
of the purchase price. In case of default, neither the vendor nor
those standing in his shoes are compelled to sue for that balance in
order to be recompensed; they may elect to retain the land. * * *
"If the conversion had been worked by will, no tax could be
levied. * * * It is difficult to see wherein the difference lies
between conversion by will and conversion by agreement of sale.
In each instance the decedent would die seised of the land, which
is the reality. Taxes should be levied upon realities, not upon
fictions. * * *
"The whole modern tendency is to limit the levying of in-
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heritance taxes
to the sovereignty which is the situs of the actual
2
property." 1
22
The decisions of the two earlier Pennsylvania cases relied upon
related solely to the application of the doctrine of equitable conversion in
the interpretation of the provisions of a will. For example, if a will contains a direction to the executor to sell all of his property and distribute
the proceeds among the beneficiaries of the will, it is considered, for the
purposes of distribution, that there has been an equitable conversion of
the real estate into personalty. There may well be a distinction, however,
between such an equitable conversion effected by the death of the owner
of real estate whose death brings into existence the liability for the inheritance tax. In other words, in such a case, the decedent actually owns
complete title to the real estate up to the date of his death, and the tax
attaches to what he owned at the date of his death. But in the case of a
contract of sale, the vendor has consummated the conversion of his interest from the ownership of real estate to the ownership of a contract relating to real estate, and when he dies, he no longer owns the real estate free
and dear, but only subject to the terms of the contract out of which he
derives his sole remaining rights with regard to the real estate. In such
a case, it cannot be said that the rule of equitable conversion is being
applied for the purpose of changing the taxable status of any property;
the status has been created by applying that rule before the incidence of
the inheritance tax.

Hence, it seems that the reliance of the Pennsylvania court upon the
two Pennsylvania cases and the comments in the Massachusetts and New
York cases, has very slim support.
The court likewise seems ta have been unfortunate when in 1931
it ventured a prophecy that the trend of deqisions was to limit the levying
of inheritance taxes to the sovereignty which is the situs of the actual
property, and relied in part upon the case of Safe Deposit & Trust Company v. Virginia.23 The doctrine of that case has probably been modified by later decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.24
Two judges dissented from the decision in the Paul case, and one of
them, Judge Maxey, wrote an exhaustive and comprehensive opinion in
which the various theories and cases were discussed. Although he pointed
out that even under previous Pennsylvania decisions the decision in the
Paulcase was wrong, he took the broader position that the contract right
'Supra note 12, at 334. 154 AtI. at 504.
'inre Robinson's Estate. supra note 14, and In re Croxton's Estate, supra note 15.
'Supra
note 18.
2
Supra note 9.
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was a matter of property which could be separately valued irrespective of
its relation to any property at all.
He disposed of the theory of equitable conversion with a brief
reference to the Robinson case:
"The distinction between that case and the case before us is
so obvious that it does not require extended discussion. In that
case the property in question was the decedent's real estate at the
time of his death, and it had its situs in another state. It had the
status of real estate at the moment of its owner's death and all inheritance rights are based on facts as they exist at the moment of a
decedent's death. Though the land was directed to be sold, it
might not be sold for years, but, regardless of when it was sold,
the only property right the decedent had in that land or in relation
to that land, at the time of his death, was the land itself. It was
not a subject over which the sovereign power of Pennsylvania
extended, and therefore was not a legitimate object of Pennsylvania
taxation. In the case before us, the vendor's interest in the extraterritorial real estate had in his lifetime been converted into a solvent
credit which attached to him in Pennsylvania. The legal creator of
that personal property was the contract in the vendor's possession,
his interest in which contract Pennsylvania recognized as a property
right. The sovereign force behind this property right was not the
state where the land described in the contract was located, but the
state of the domicile of the man who by that contract was endowed
with certain rights of pecuniary value which his own state would
enforce. This property right was as clearly taxable in Pennsylvania
as it would have been if it had been based on promissory notes given
(Italics the
by the solvent vendee for the purchase of land."
court's.) 25

Then, enlarging upon the true character of a contract of sale, he
said:
"*

*

* it contractually creates and evidences certain rights

of pecuniary value which the law recognizes and will enforce, to
wit, the right of the vendor to demand from the vendee a sum of
money stipulated to be paid. If Paul had agreed to sell to his solvent debtor, and the latter to buy, a tract of land, say, in Florida, in
1925 for $100,000, retaining the naked title as security, and a
year later that land had become worthless, Paul's property in that
contract would still be worth $100,000, and would be listed as
such among his assets, even though the land itself had become
worthless. * * * When a man sells property, real or personal, on a
contract, retaining the title in himself, the retained title is only a
'Supra note 12, at 341, 154 At. at 506.
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pawn. The other's debt to him is his credit, and is correctly listed
among his assets as property, regardless of the pawn. * * *
"[The vendor] acquires from the legally enforceable contract
a right of property distinct from the land to which it relates, this
right of property being intangible personalty (sometimes called 'a
solvent credit,' sometimes called 'a chose in action') whose situs
for taxation and other purposes is its owner's domicile. This property is not any 'make-believe' or legal fiction, but it is an economic
and legal fact. 'Wealth in a commercial age is made up largely of
promises.' Pound's introduction to the Philosophy of Law, p. 236.
Even a government bond or a greenback is only a promise, but it is
clearly taxable as property." 2 ';
In the light of this analysis of the Paul decision, it does not seem
significant that the application for certiorari made to the United States
Supreme Court in that case was denied.

District Attorneys Meet
A meeting of the District Attorneys' Association, a section of the
Colorado Bar Association, was held at the Broadmoor Hotel, September
13, 1941, with James M. Noland of Durango, president of the section,
presiding.
About thirty-five district attorneys, their assistants and deputies,
from virtually every judicial district of the state, were present and participated in the round table discussions which followed remarks of the
speakers. Principal speakers were James Henderson, Assistant Attorney
General, and Harry Bundy, Superintendent of the Colorado Industrial
School, both of whom delivered informative and interesting talks on
Colorado juvenile laws and juvenile institutions.
A. L. Betke, compiler and editor of the new Betke criminal digest
for Colorado, was present, and spoke briefly on his new book. Attorney
General Gail Ireland also attended the meeting and gave a brief address.
This was the first meeting of the section held in conjunction with
the annual meeting of the state association, and it is now planned to make
it an annual event. The regular annual session of the District Attorneys'
Association will be held in Denver next January.
'Supra note 12, at 338, 154 Ad. at 506.

